The Limewire Ruling: New King of the Hill for Illegal Downloading Decisions

The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against LimeWire and its parent company, Lime Group, finding them liable for inducement of copyright infringement based on the use of their service by subscribers. 

U.S. District Judge Kimba Wood issued the 59-page decision Wednesday, siding with the 13 record companies that sued Lime Wire LLC and founder and Chairman Mark Gorton through the RIAA claiming copyright infringement and unfair competition.

In finding the company liable, Wood opined that LimeWire had optimized its application to "ensure that users can download digital recordings, the majority of which are protected by copyright," and that the company actively "assists users in committing infringement."  Wood also found that the defendants knew their technology was being used to download copyrighted tunes and took no "meaningful steps" to prevent the infringement. In addition, Lime Wire marketed its software to people "predisposed to committing infringement" and assisted those people, the judge ruled.

Major labels, as represented by the RIAA, were predictably thrilled with the outcome.  "This definitive ruling is an extraordinary victory for the entire creative community.  The court made clear that LimeWire was liable for inducing widespread copyright theft," RIAA chairman and CEO Mitch Bainwol relayed.

Lime Wire Chief Executive George Searle issued a statement saying the company "strongly opposed the court's recent decision."  The statement continued:

"Lime Wire remains committed to developing innovative products and services for the end-user and to working with the entire music industry, including the major labels, to achieve this mission," Searle said.

Searle did not say whether Limewire would appeal the ruling.

The Recording Industry Association of America proclaimed the decision was "an important milestone" in the battle against online copyright infringement, because Gorton was found personally liable, in addition to the company of which he was the chairman.  Personal liability against a corporate director is rare.

"The court has sent a clear signal to those who think they can devise and profit from a piracy scheme that will escape accountability," Mitch Bainwol, chairman and chief executive of the RIAA, said in a statement.

LimeWire, launched in 2000, is one of the largest remaining commercial peer-to-peer services left on the Web. The company claims to have more than 50 million monthly users.  The company has managed to defend itself against major label legal action for years.  

In issuing her opinion, Wood relied heavily on the 2005 Grokster ruling, in which the Supreme Court said that a file-sharing service was liable when customers were induced to use it for swapping songs and movies illegally.  The test established by the Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster for provider liability is whether the company actively induced users to commit infringing activities.  While LimeWire argued that it did not, Judge Wood noted that the company actively  “markets LimeWire to users predisposed to committing infringement.”

The record companies that sued Lime Wire included Arista, Atlantic, BMG Music, Capital, Elektra, Interscope, LaFace, Motown, Priority, Sony BMG, UMG, Virgin and Warner Brothers.

Law on the “ROAD”

Starting in June, the author of this blog, Law on the Row  - 20-year entertainment attorney veteran Barry Neil Shrum - will be taking the show on the road!  On June 5, 2009, Mr. Shrum will conduct the first of a series of national seminars called MBA, Music Business Academy. 

Mr. Shrum initiated this series of seminars to address a perceived need in the industry: that a growing number of artists, entertainers and songwriters who might benefit from the expertise of an entertainment attorney, could not afford to retain an attorney and get the help they need due to upfront fees and retainers.  To this end, the mission statement for MBA is “music business education for the do-it-yourself generation!”  This unique series of one-day sessions will provide the upcoming and established mid-tier artist, musician, songwriter and other music industry professionals with a cost-effective method of obtaining an essential legal foundation for day-to-day music industry survival. 

The goal of the seminar is to create a sense of being in the client chair, Mr. Shrum will unravel the essential provisions of various industry-specific agreements  - bringing clarity to the legalese and identifying red flags in the “small print.”  Some specific agreements covered in the MBA session are:

*    the exclusive recording agreement (and the new 360 deal)
*    the exclusive songwriting agreement
*    the personal management agreement

For the do-it-yourself generation, Mr. Shrum will also explain the details and implications of guerilla marketing on the web.  He will explore the typical iTunes deal as well as other online distribution issues relevant to today’s guerilla marketers.

When asked about the seminar, Riq Lazarus, of Lazarus Management Group, said:

"Barry Shrum gets it!  The music business is undergoing radical change.  It is absolutely essential that today's artists have an understanding of the legal issues facing them in this new era of "do-it-yourself" broadcasting.  And because he has the heart of a teacher, Barry's immense knowledge and experience enables him to empower you with the understanding you need to protect your creations."

It is Mr. Shrum’s goal that attendees walk away from the seminar with a functional understanding of basic copyright, trademark and contract law — a virtual “MBA” in the music business!  Attendees will also receive specialized written materials as a continuing reference and valuable resource and are given the opportunity to purchase reduced rate legal services from Mr. Shrum.

The date of June 5, 2009 has been set for Chattanooga – the day before the Riverbend Festival - and plans are in the works for seminars in Denver, Colorado and Charlotte, West Virginia.   Other cities under consideration are Austin, Texas, Baltimore, Maryland, Boston, Massachusetts, Atlanta, Georgia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  To see if your city is being considered, or to vote for your city, take the online poll.

General information about the seminars can be found here.  A detailed agenda of the Chattanooga seminar can be found at the event website:  www.musicbusinessacademy.info

 

Register Now! online event registration by RegOnline

Technorati Tags: Music Business,Seminar,Music Law,Music Publishing Contracts,Exclusive Songwriting Agreement,Exclusive Recording Agreement,Record Contract,Personal Management Agreement,Music Industry

Judiciary Committee holds hearings on HR 848, the “Performance Rights Act”

The House Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on H.R. 848 (this year’s version of HR 4789) tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m.  Although the Committee’s website does not identify any witnesses at this time, I am informed by musicFIRST that Smashing Pumpkins’ founder Billy Corgan and Mitch Bainwol, chairman and CEO of the RIAA will be speaking on their behalf at the hearing.

H.R. 848 was introduced to the 111th Congress by Rep. John Conyers on February 4, 2009 then referred to committee on the same day.  It was co-sponsored by Tennessee representative, Marsha Blackburn.  If passed, HR 848 would amend The Copyright Act (specifically Title 17) to provide “parity in radio performance rights” under the Copyright Act.  In other words, the Bill would grant a performance rights in sound recordings performed over terrestrial broadcasts (i.e., traditional radio broadcasts, not satellite).   S. 379 is the Senate’s complimentary bill, introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy.

The act has certain provisions to accommodate concerns by the broadcast industry, such as the provision which establishes a flat annual fee in lieu of payment of royalties for individual terrestrial broadcast stations with gross revenues of less than $1.25 million and for non-commercial, public broadcast stations; the provision which grants an exemption from royalty payments for broadcasts of religious services and for incidental uses of musical sound recordings; and the provision which grants terrestrial broadcast stations that make limited feature uses of sound recordings the option to obtain per program licenses. 

The Act specifically states that it will not adversely affect the public performance rights or royalties payable to songwriters or copyright owners of musical works.   In particular, the Act prohibits taking into account the rates established by the Copyright Royalty Judges in any proceeding to reduce or adversely affect the license fees payable for public performances by terrestrial broadcast stations. Requires that such license fees for the public performance of musical works be independent of license fees paid for the public performance of sound recordings.

The full text of the bill can be found at govtrack.us.

One provision I found interesting was Section 6, (1)(A), regarding payment of certain royalties, that states, in full:

A featured recording artist who performs on a sound recording that has been licensed for public performance by means of a digital audio transmission shall be entitled to receive payments from the copyright owner of the sound recording in accordance with the terms of the artist's contract.

Emphasis added.  This last clause intrigues me.  What I find interesting about it is that under the current structure, the record labels own most, if not all, of the commercial sound recording masters, i.e., they are the “copyright owner of the sound recording.”  This clause entitles the “featured recording artist,” e.g., Madonna, Michael Jackson, etc., to receive payments from the owner “in accordance with the terms of the artist’s contract.” 

In most artists’ contracts, payments are based on a percentage of the gross revenues from sales of physical units – current artist contracts do not have provision for payment of performance royalties on the sound recording.  It would seem that under the Act as written, there is silence as to what happens in this instance where these specific payments of performance royalties are not addressed in the artist’s contract.  One possible remedy would be for the legislators to draft language that would apply, such as what they have done with regard to the “non-featured artists in subsection (B) of the same Section 6.   This Section 6 is not found in the Senate’s version of the legislation.

All of this makes me curious about what will happen to performance royalties that are paid under this Act to the owners of the sound recording copyrights, i.e. the record labels if there is no language in the artists’ recording agreements to specify as to what percentage the artist is entitled?  One thing is certain:  an artist who is not recouped under his artist recording agreement will never see any of these performance royalties under such time as his balance is recouped.

One proposal you might suggest to your representatives is that they consider a payment structure similar to that of the current performance rights organizations that collect and pay performance royalties for musical compositions, wherein one half of the royalties go directly to the songwriter and the other half directly to the publisher.  If this were the case under the new Act, half of the royalty payments would filter directly to the artist and the other half would go to the record labels.  If there truly is a concern about the recording artists not getting paid for his or her performances, this is the only method that would assure this happens.

If you are a recording artist whose performances are being playing on local FM and AM radios, you should investigate the impact this legislation will have on you.  Call you Senators and Representatives and ask them to keep you updated.

Technorati Tags: legislation,HR 848,performance rights act,2009,111th Congress,record labels,music industry,entertainment industry,recording contracts,entertainment law,music law,music lawyer

My interview appearing on Metacafe.com

The interview that I gave to DigimusicTV.com is becoming viral.  Metacafe has it in three parts:

Barry Shrum Entertainment Attorney Part 1 

Barry Shrum Entertainment Attorney Part 2 

Barry Shrum Entertainment Attorney Part 3 

Technorati Tags: Music Lawyer,Music Attorney,Entertainment Lawyer,Entertainment Attorney,Music Row,Copyright Lawyer,Nashville,Tennessee,Copyright Infringement

Second Circuit gets it wrong in Cartoon Network v. Cablevision

On August 4, 2008, the Second Circuit court of appeals overturned a lower courts opinion that Cablevision's Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder ("RS-DVR") system violated the Copyright Act by infringing plaintiffs’ exclusive rights of reproduction and public perf ormance.  The full 44-page opinion is available at Cartoon Network, LLP, et al. v. Cablevision.  In my humble yet fully animated opinion, the Second Circuit's opinion was not at all well reasoned nor, for that matter, even common sense -- I believe it misinterprets at three very important areas of the Copyright Act and interpretation thereof:

When is a work "Fixed" According to Section 101

Through a system of buffers, Cablevision's RS-DVR will allow customers who do not own stand alone DVR's to record programming, which resides on Cablevision's servers, and "time-shift" it to view it at a later date.  Certainly a great concept, but one which, in my opinion, should require authorization from the owners of the copyrights. 

In arriving at its conclusion, the court determined that the buffer used to process the steam of data only "copies" the data for a duration of 1.2 seconds, before transferring it to another buffer used to reconstruct a copy of the program for any customer who has asked to view it at a later time.  The court concluded that this "embodiment," i.e. the copy, was transitory in duration and therefore not "fixed" pursuant to Section 101 of the Copyright Act.  Therefore, the copyright owners' right of reproduction was not violated.  This is clearly erroneous reasoning:

The definition of "fixed" in Section 101 of the Copyright Act states, in its entirety:

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

In arriving at its determination, the Second Circuit focused on its condensed version of the definition, i.e. a work is “fixed” when its embodiment “. . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”  The court concluded, based on this shortened version of the definition, that the "language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements, i.e. an "embodiment requirement" and a "duration requirement."

The Second Circuit's error is grammatical in nature:  it misinterprets the language of the definition of "fixed" by assuming that the phrase "for a period of more than transitory duration" modifies the words "permanent or stable" when in fact it actually modifies the antecedent phrase "permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated."  This is certainly the case with regard to the RS-DVR - it fixes the copies for in sufficiently permanent state in one buffer (i.e. the 1.2 seconds) to permit them to be reproduced in another buffer for a period of more than transitory duration.  Thus, the court got it wrong.

Without getting into too much detail, the court also incorrectly analyzes a 9th Circuit cases, MAI Systems and its progeny which correctly apply the definition of fixed to a copy of a work created in RAM memory for a period of minutes.  The effect of this misinterpretation is to put legal practitioners in the precarious position of trying to determine at what point between 1.2 seconds and 2 minutes does a reproduction arrive at a "more than transitory" state.

Ironically, the Second Circuit ignores the U.S. Copyright Office's analysis of this precise issue in its 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which elaborated that a work was fixed "unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated."  This clarification is in line with my earlier interpretation that the phrase "more than transitory in duration" modifies the communication or perception, not the embodiment itself.  The Second Circuit stated that, in its mind, the U.S. Copyright Office's interpretation "reads the 'transitory duration' language out of the statute."  To the contrary, however, it is the correct interpretation in that it incorporates the transitory duration requirement into the appropriate section of the definition.

Finally, the Second Circuit completely ignores the last sentence of the definition, to wit:  A work . . . is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission."  In this instance, the court readily admitted that an unauthorized copy of the work was stored, i.e. "fixed" on Cablevision's servers simultaneously with its transmission.

When is an infringer not an infringer?

In extending recent trends by some circuits to weaken the strict liability component of the Copyright Act, the Second Court refused to find that Cablevision was a direct infringer.  Instead, it rules that the customer is the direct infringer in this instance of digital recording, showing his or her intent to make a copy when he or she presses the record button on the remote.  The court reasons as follows:

In this case . . . the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the infringing conduct.  After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that program airs, a copy of the program–a copyrighted work–resides on
the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made  this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.

Emphasis mine.  The first thing to note about the court's conclusion is that it realizes, right off the bat, that the copy created on the servers of Cablevision is an infringement.  In its mind, however, the only question is who made the copy.  Now, that, of course, flies directly in the face of a host of copyright concepts which I will not address here, but suffice it to say that this is problematic.

But, for the moment, let's just examine how the court ultimately determines who had the "volition" to infringe in this specific case:

There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems  clear–and we know of no case holding otherwise–that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.

The court then continues its analysis by example, offering the examples of a retailer who owns a photocopier and rents it out to the public as reinforcement of its conclusion, finding that because the retailer would not be liable for infringement, neither should Cablevision.   Despite the fact that there is case law holding that such a retailer WOULD, in fact, be liable for infringement, the Second Circuit errs in failing to see the difference between a VCR in the analog world, a single, stand-alone device used express by the customer, and a process devised by a company which makes infringement as simple as pressing my record button on my remote.  The court does not find this a "sufficient" distinction.  The court's error in logic is apparent in this prose when it examines a 6th Circuit case on the issue:

In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.

Is this 2001 Space Odyssey?  Did H.A.L. take over when I wasn't looking?  Who programmed the system?  

If this were not enough, the Second Circuit then performs a great deal of legal gymnastics to support its finding:  First, it examines the video on demand process to illustrate that Cablevision does not have control over the transmissions being recorded by the subscribers in the RS-VCR system.  Are they for real?  Ever heard of apples and oranges.  The VOD system is a fully licensed process which is, dare we say it, nothing like the RS-VCR system.  Secondly, the Second Circuit uses the distinction between "active" and "passive" infringement under the Patent Act to jump to the almost humorous, if it weren't so wrong, conclusion that:

If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute that would have this effect.

Every intellectual property attorney worth his or her salt knows that the Copyright Act and the Patent Act are very limited in their usefulness for purposes of using one to interpret the other.  That's why it's said that the Copyright Act is a strict liability statute, whereas, the Patent Act is not so much.

When is work "publicly performed"?

The final error committed by the court is in its analysis of whether the buffered copy delivered to individual customers was "publicly performed." In this regard, the Second Circuit concluded:

under the transmit clause, we must examine the potential audience of a given transmission by an alleged infringer to determine whether that transmission is “to the public.” And because the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission.

Again, the Second Circuit has to do a hatchet job on the definition of "public performance" in order to arrive at this convoluted conclusion.  The definition of "public performance" in the Copyright Act is actually found in the "publication" definition of Section 101.  It states, in its entirety:

To perform or display a work “publicly” means — 

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Emphasis mine.  Whereas the Second Circuit zeroed in on the phrase "to the public" in making its determination, the definition clearly intends to define public performance as any process that allows the public, in general, the ability to receive the transmission, whether or not it is in the same place or the same time.  Its not very difficult to see the fallacy of the Second Circuit's reasoning.   The Cablevision RS-DVR clearly does precisely what the definition anticipates, it creates multiple copies stored in the buffers for individual subscribers in multiple places, who then view the (buffered) transmissions at different times. 

While this seems simple, the Second Circuit jumps through numerous irrational hoops to arrive at the idea that:

the transmit clause directs us to identify the potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons “capable of receiving” it, to determine whether that transmission is made “to the public.”

Nothing in the statute dictates this conclusion, to the contrary, the legislators probably thought that the word "public" was generic enough to not need interpretation. 

The effect of this ruling, at least for now, is that anyone can make digital copies of any copyrighted work on their servers for purposes of transmitting to an individual customer, so long as that individual customer makes a request for it, and there is no implication of the performance rights.

This is a fine example of a court "reasoning" the meaning completely out of a statute. 

Conclusion

If it is not obvious by now, I think this is one of the most poorly reasoned and drafted opinions by a Circuit Court that I have read in a long time.  If there is a bright side, it is that the effect of this decision is primarily that it overturns the grant of a summary judgement by the lower court.  From a broader perspective, however, and the more unfortunate result is that, because of the concept of stare decisis, this reasoning can now be cited in other cases in other jurisdictions across the country as good law.  So, unfortunately, we entertainment attorneys will be dealing with the negative impact of this decision for some time to come, until perhaps some higher court, in this case the Supremes, decides to rectify it.

Technorati Tags: Copyright Infringement,Direct Infringement,Contributory Infringement,Fixation,Public Performance,Performance Royalties,Digital Downloads,Intellectual Property,Internet Law,Computer Law

Barry Shrum's interview with DigiMusicTV.com

I was surfing around yesterday and discovered that my interview with DigiMusicTV.com, recorded in 2007, was recently posted on brightcove.  Here it is in all it's glory:

You Say You Want A REVOLUTION?

You say you want a revolution

Well, you know

We all want to change the world . . .

 

You say you've got a real solution

Well, you know

We'd all love to see the plan

You ask me for a contribution

Well, you know

We are doing what we can

 

But if you want money

for people with minds that hate

All I can tell is, brother, you'll have to wait

 

Don't you know it's gonna be alright?

 

-John Lennon

Perhaps John Lennon said it best:  if you push people hard enough and long enough, they will revolt.  The question is, has the RIAA gone too far for too long? A recent motion filed in their case against students at the University of Maine may very well answer that question.

The RIAA named numerous "John Doe" students in their complaint in Arista Records v. Does 1-27, as is their practice in all of their lawsuits.   The RIAA's purpose of naming the John Doe defendants is so that they may obtain an ex parte (i.e., without the other party being notified) order from the Judge requiring the targeted university to provide the various students' name, address, and, particularly, their IP address.

Student lawyers at the University school of law Cumberland Legal Clinic have filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the RIAA claiming that this practice improperly seeks to circumvent the student's rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, §1232g(b)(2)(B) ("FERPA"), gain publicity for its cause, and coerce students into settling for "nominal" amounts in the $3-5000 range.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions against an attorney who signs a pleading without properly investigating the facts and the law and does so with an improper purpose.

The motion also questions whether the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants under the RIAA-type lawsuits is proper because the actions do not, in fact, arise out of the same transaction.  Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides that multiple plaintiffs can join in one action if “they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences…and any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).  Similarly, multiple defendants can be joined in one action if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transaction or occurrences . . . and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id.  The student motion alleges that the RIAA does not, in fact, believe that all of these copyright infringements arise out of the same facts, but join together against multiple defendants for the sole purpose of trimming litigation and discovery costs.

In this case, the student lawyers are seeking more than just monetary damages under this Rule 11 motion:  they also seek dismissal of the complaint and a permanent injunction preventing the RIAA from filing "fishing expedition" type complaints against "unconnected" defendants in the future.  These types of injunctions may be applied in jurisdictions other than the one in which it was issued, so in theory such an order may be applied to thwart lawsuits in other Federal courts across the country.

This in one ruling that should be very interesting.

 

Technorati Tags: RIAA Litigation,Digital Downloads,MP3,Entertainment Lawyer,Music Lawyer,Music Law,Copyright Infringement

Fair is not always "Fair Use"

The concept of “fair use” is a very misunderstood concept.  The first common misunderstanding that people espouse is that the concept of “fair use” is a right or privilege granted by copyright law.  It is not.  Secondly, many people mistakenly believe that so long as they do not make any money from an infringing use of copyrighted material, then the use is a fair use.  This is also an incorrect assumption. 

Fair use is not a right or a privilege to be exercised at one’s whim.  Rather, the doctrine is an “equitable rule of reason” that may be used as an affirmative d

efense in a copyright infringement action.  The purpose of the rule is to balance the equities between the desire to protect and therefore encourage the creation of new ideas and the desire to encourage the free exchange of speech in the marketplace of ideas.  The tension was described by Justice Souter as “simultaneously protect[ing] copyrighted material and allow[ing] others to build upon it.”  Nonetheless, the thing to remember is that application of the fair use defense is declared by judicial fiat in the context of a copyright infringement action.  It is applied on a case-by-case analysis of the factual situation.  Thus, fair use is not a presumptive right or privilege that may be exercised by the infringing party.

There are four factors weighed by the Supreme Court in making a determination of whether a derivative work constitutes a “fair use.”  These factors are (1) the nature of the work itself; (2) whether or not the work is commercial in nature; (3) the amount of the copyright work that is used; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market or value of the copyright at issue. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), codified at §107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.

The nature of the work refers to the “nature” of the unauthorized derivative work, not the original copyright work.  In order for such an unauthorized use of copyrighted material to be entitled to the“fair use” defense, the new creation must transform the original copyrighted material.  A “transformative work” is defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”  See, Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).   While all factors must be considered, this is perhaps one of the more critical factors in the analysis.  Merely modulating the pitch of a song or inverting the sequence of a chord progression would probably not be considered transformative.   A very good example of a derivative work that is transformative in nature is Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, the same story as Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind, but told from the perspective of a mulatto slave who is the half-sister of Scarlet O’Hara, the main character in the original work.  See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir 2001) per curiam, opinion at 268 F.3d 1257.  In that case, the Eleventh Circuit extended the protection of a musical parody in Acuff Rose to the novel.

With regard to the second factor as to whether a use is commercial in nature, it should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that the new creation has to generate profits.  If the new work create a significant fan, donor and/or advertiser base, those factors tend to lead to a conclusion that it is commercial in nature.  A person simply does not have the “right” to use copyrighted works in any manner as long as no profit is generated from the use.   It is also evident that this factor does not mean that simply because a derivative use does in fact generate profits, that it is by default not a fair use.  In Acuff Rose, 2 Live Crew’s parody version of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman had sold over 250,000 copies, yet was still considered a “fair use.”  The thing to be remembered is that this is but one of the factors.

The third factor is fairly easy to evaluate: the more material “borrowed” from the copyrighted source, the less likely the infringer is to have a “fair use” defense.  Again, another misconception is that there is a bright line test for fair use:  that a few measures of a song, a couple of lines from a poem, a few hundred words of a paragraph, or a few paragraphs from a book, are considered fair use.  This misconception has no basis in either the Copyright Act or the case law interpreting it.  It is merely folklore.  The factor, as used by the courts, is more of a sliding scale based, again, on the quantity of the material used from the copyrighted work as compared to the total material.

Finally, the last factor weighs the impact on the infringing use on the potential market and value of the copyright.  This was an integral part of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Acuff Rose that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman did not impact the potential market for the original.   The more a derivative work negatively impacts the potential market for and value of the copyright, the less likely it will a "fair use."

In summary, as you may have noticed, the fair use doctrine is by no means a bright line test.  Each “fair use” defense is, by its very nature, evaluated on a case by case analysis in the context of a copyright infringement action.  Fair use is not something to be relied on as a presumptive right.

Technorati Tags: Fair Use,Copyright Infringement,Parody,Music Lawyer,Entertainment Lawyer,Music Law,Entertainment Law,Campell v. Acuff Rose

"More than a Feeling" - Momma, look what they've done to my song!

I received a call from one of my readers to address the topic of whether a songwriter has the ability to restrict the use of his or her composition in the instance it is being used in advancing a cause opposite to that espoused by the songwriter.  This was spawned, of course, by the recent allegations of Tom Scholz, lead member of the group Boston, that his 1970's mega-smash "More than a Feeling" was being used by Mike Huckabee, whose views were opposite those held by Scholz.  It is an interesting inquiry, and one that has simple solutions, mostly based in contract law.

There are two contract concepts that are usually incorporated into standard music publishing agreements which impact this issue:  one is the concept of droit or moral rights and two is the restrictions on exploitation.  I'll address them in reverse order.

Grant of Rights

Typically, when a songwriter assigns his copyright in a song to a music publisher, there is grant language contained in the agreement expressly establishing the rights he or she is granting to the music publisher.  In that contract language, there is typically a clause that reads something like this:

The Publisher shall have the right to administer, use and exploit all interests in the Compositions . . . provided, however, that the approval of Writer shall be required for the use of any Composition:

             (i)    in any motion picture which Publisher has actual knowledge of an "X" or equivalent rating; 

             (ii)    in any advertisement or other promotion for  tobacco, firearms or personal hygiene products; or

             (iii)    in connection with religious or political purposes.

As you can plainly see, in this instance at least, the music publisher would be contractually required to obtain the approval of the writer prior to authorizing the use of the composition in a political rally, among other things. 

If this type of language is not included in the songwriter agreement, or if the grant language included in the songwriter's agreement is, in general, more broadly worded, then the rights of the songwriter to restrict the use of the song would be greatly impaired.

Droit or Moral Rights

The other legal concept which comes in to play, both from an historic perspective and contractually, is the concept of droit or "moral" rights, although it is important to realize up front that this concept is most often applied, in the U.S. at least, to works of visual art, not musical compositions. 

First, in connection to the copyright concept, don't infuse the the word "moral" with the ethical connotations generally associated with in in the United States.  The use in this concept is much more in the sense of an embodiment of a type of something, i.e., the Monet painting is the moral equivalent of impressionist art.  As used in this sense, it refers to the ability of the creator of a copyright to control the "embodiment" of his work, or its "integrity."  The French-derived word "Droit" is, perhaps, more to the point when discussing copyright:  it means "a legal right." 

So, in the United States at least, the phrase "droit" or "moral rights" generally refers to the right of the copyright creator to prevent third parties from taking credit for, revising, altering, or distorting his or her creation, regardless of who owns the work, i.e., regardless of whether the copyright has been assigned or transferred. 

In contrast, the concept has generally received much broader application in European states.  France, for example, recognizes four moral rights: 

1. the right of disclosure;
2. the right to correct or withdraw works previously disclosed to the public;
3. the right of attribution; and
4. the right of integrity (the right to "respect" the work).

When the U.S. joined the Berne Convention, Congress attempted to bring its copyright laws into line with those of the other signatory companies by passing Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) codified generally at 17 U.S.C. §§106, 106A, and 113.   As implied earlier, however, this statute applies solely to visual arts and not musical compositions.  Nonetheless, the concept of droit or moral rights may be invoked when dealing with the misappropriation of a songwriter's musical composition.

In addition to copyright law, there a several other legal concepts which may be implicated in this situation.  For example, if a person is somehow giving false attribution to a creative work, e.g., attempting to pass off an creator's work as his or her own, that person may be liable under the concept of "unfair competition," which is barred by the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1051).  Or, if the creation is widely recognized as a work of the creator, any distortion or alteration of the creation may constitute trademark "dilution" under trade dress laws and statutes.   More generally, if authorship of a work is somehow falsely attributed, the creator may have a state action for defamation against the person responsible for the false attribution.  If a person uses the identity of an songwriter, or the compositions, for his or her own benefit without permission, a violation the songwriter's right of publicity may have occurred.  Thus, there may be several remedies available in this type of situation.

In the US, however, it is accepted practice that if a person can waive a right, such a waiver will be in a contract.  This is no exception.  Again, there is language in most songwriting agreements which "waives all droit or moral rights" in the copyright.  Such a waiver would likely nullify any of these general legal remedies available to the songwriter.

As always, I highly recommend that any songwriter contemplating a deal with a music publisher contact a reputable entertainment attorney.

Technorati Tags: More than a Feeling,Tom Schulz,Boston,70's Rock,Copyright Infringement,Music Publishing,Songwriters,Songwriting,Music Lawyer,Copyright law,Droit Rights,Moral Rights

Atlantic Records et al. v. Brennan: Federal Judge Denies Default Judgment for RIAA

U.S. District Judge for the District of Connecticut  Justice Janet Bond Arterton, handed down a very pointed and decisive opinion hammering the R.I.A.A. for its boilerplate style of pleading in the nationwide wide campaign against illegal file sharing.   Justice Arterton was appointed by President Clinton in 1995.  The full decision is here:  Decision.  At several key junctures in the opinion, Justice Arterton based her opinion on the fact that the Plaintiff's complaint was based on "information and belief" rather than direct evidence.

The two areas of concern in the opinion, one is whether to grant a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and the second is whether the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b).

Default Judgment Analysis under Rule 55(b)(2)

The granting of default judgment is generally almost a "rubber stamp" kind of process.  If the defendant is properly served and fails to respond to the complaint, a default judgment is almost always automatic.  If the complaint demands an exact amount as judgment, the default judgment can even be entered by the court's clerk under Rule 55(b)(1).  If not, then the court holds a hearing to determine the amount of damages under Rule 55(b)(2).  In this instance, however, the court stepped in and took it upon herself to examine the validity of the claims.

Reasoning from a 2nd Circuit case, Au Bon Pain Corp.v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1981), the court found that the default judgment process is not, in fact, automatic, but that “a district court has discretion . . . to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action.”  Artect, at 65, citing Wright & Miller, a well known legal treatise on procedure. 

Looking a another legal treatise, Moore's Federal Practice, Justice Arterton reasoned that the analysis should combine elements from Rule 55(c), the rule allowing the setting aside of a default judgment, and Rule 60(b), a more generic rule allowing  a court to set aside judgments.  Finding support for this analysis in 2nd Circuit case law, the court held that three factors arose in determining whether to set aside a judgment under either of the two rules:  (1) “the willfulness of default”; (2) “the existence of a meritorious defense”; and (3) “the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiffs should the default judgment be vacated.”

In weighing these factors, the judge determined that the latter two factors shifted in favor of the defendant, i.e., there were abundant meritorious defenses raised in similar cases filed by the RIAA across the country, and the Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by being required to produce more specific evidence.  In both instances, the court again mentioned the language that the Plaintiff's complaint was based on "information and belief."

Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted under Rule 12(b)(6)

The more telling section of the opinion is the court's ostensibly sua sponte (i.e., of its own accord) analysis of whether the Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This rule generally gives the defendant a right to raise this defense in a response to a complaint.   Ostensibly, the court raised this issue in the context of possible meritorious defenses.

Justice Arterton cites the recent Supreme Court opinion that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (2007).  She then observed that Plaintiff's complaint in this case was almost identical to the one filed in Interscope Records v. Rodriguez, where the court held:

Plaintiff here must present at least some facts to show the plausibility of their allegations of copyright infringement against the Defendant. However, other than the bare conclusory statement that on “information and belief” Defendant has downloaded, distributed and/or made available for distribution to the public copyrighted works, Plaintiffs have presented no facts that would indicate that this allegation is anything more than speculation. The complaint is simply a boilerplate listing of the elements of copyright infringement without any facts pertaining specifically to the instant Defendant. The Court therefore finds that the complaint fails to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted and entry of default judgment is not warranted.

Rodriguez, No. 06-2485, 2007 WL 2408484, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007).  Citing the Second Circuit case Greyhound Exhibit Group, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty
Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992), which held that the entry of default “constitute[s] a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability," Justice Arterton ruled that Plaintiff's complaint was "speculative" and "inadequate."

Eric Bangeman, of Ars Technica reports that the RIAA plans to file a brief, probably accompanying a motion for reconsideration, and possible an amended complaint, as they did in Interscope v. Rodriguez.  The amended complaint provided additional details about dates, times, and IP addresses.  Whether the additional details of that amendment will alter the application of Rule 12(b)(6) is still unknown, as the judge in that case has since retired.

Technorati Tags: RIAA Litigation,Digital Downloads,Copyright Infringement,File Sharing

New Copyright Legislation, H.R. 4279, being considered by House Committee on the Judiciary

The U.S. House of Representatives introduced a 69-page bill entitled the "Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2007."  The legislation is significant in that it increases civil penalties for copyright infringement, expands criminal enforcement, and creates both a new federal agency and a new division of the Attorney General's office of the Department of Justice.   The full text of the proposed legislation is here:  H.R. 4279.  I have established an RSS feed in the column of my blog for tracking purposes. 

It is important to realize that, up front, that this is proposed legislation.  This is the first step in the legislative process. The first step in the life of a bill, if you recall your Schoolhouse Rock song, I'm Just a Bill, is referral to a committees that deliberates, investigates, and revises the proposed legislation before it is recommended that it proceed to general debate by the full House of Representatives.  This process can take a long time, or get stalled.  In fact, the majority of bills never make it out of committee.  The ones that do often do not resemble the proposed legislation very much at all, as sometimes the text goes through numerous iterations before it gets recommended, if at all. Other times, sections of a proposed bill may be incorporated into another bill, and in those cases the original bill, as it was introduced, is abandoned.  That is say that a lot can happen before this process ends.  Once a bill is approved by the House of Representatives, the process starts all over again in the Senate!

The major sections of the proposed legislation are:

* TITLE I—Enhancements to Civil Intellectual Property Laws  One of the more significant amendments to Section 104 of the Copyright Act, pursuant to this proposed legislation, is that it would allow courts to make "multiple awards of statutory damages" when compilations are infringed or when both derivatives and the original are infringed.  

 

TITLE II—Enhancements to Criminal Intellectual Property Laws   This is one of the more extensive expansions of the proposed legislation, allowing for stricter enforcement of willful, criminal infringement. 

TITLE III—Coordination and Strategic Planning of Federal Effort Against Counterfeiting and Piracy

This title is perhaps the most sweeping part of the proposed legislation.  The effect would be the creation of a new federal bureaucracy called the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Representative (other reports state that is it called the "White House Intellectual Property Enforcement Representative, or WHIPER, but that designation does not appear in the proposed legislation). The head of this new agency would be a member of the Executive Branch and, therefore, would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The new post would report directly to the president and serve as his or her principal advisor and spokesman regarding intellectual property matters, including, for example, identifying countries that don't adequately protect IP rights or are not in compliance with international treaties.

As part of this new agency, a new "interagency" committee would be established for the purpose of intellectual property enforcement.  The new committee would be composed of the enforcement representative, who would chair the committee, and senior representatives of various departments and agencies involved in intellectual property enforcement, appointed by the respective heads of those departments and agencies.  Those agencies include the DOJ, the Trademark Office, the Copyright Office and Homeland Security, just to name a few.

TITLE IV—International Enforcement and Coordination

Under this section, the Trademark Office will appoint 10 intellectual property attachés to serve in United States embassies. The 10 appointments shall be in addition to personnel serving in the capacity of intellectual property attaché at United States embassies or other diplomatic missions on the date of the enactment of this Act.

TITLE V—Department of Justice Programs

In this section, the proposed legislation would created within the U.S. Justice Department's an "Intellectual Property Enforcement Division" to subsume the IP-related functions that the department's computer crime section in the criminal division currently performs. The new division would receive $25 million per year to start with.

This is by no means an exhaustive analysis of this proposed legislation, so take the time to read it for yourself and, if appropriate, contact you local representative to comment on the proposed legislation.

 

Technorati Tags: Copyright Legislation,Copyright Law,House of Representatives,Statutory Damages