Showing posts with label DRM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DRM. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

Second Circuit gets it wrong in Cartoon Network v. Cablevision

On August 4, 2008, the Second Circuit court of appeals overturned a lower courts opinion that Cablevision's Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder ("RS-DVR") system violated the Copyright Act by infringing plaintiffs’ exclusive rights of reproduction and public perfCartoon Network ormance.  The full 44-page opinion is available at Cartoon Network, LLP, et al. v. Cablevision.  In my humble yet fully animated opinion, the Second Circuit's opinion was not at all well reasoned nor, for that matter, even common sense -- I believe it misinterprets at three very important areas of the Copyright Act and interpretation thereof:

When is a work "Fixed" According to Section 101

Through a system of buffers, Cablevision's RS-DVR will allow customers who do not own stand alone DVR's to record programming, which resides on Cablevision's servers, and "time-shift" it to view it at a later date.  Certainly a great concept, but one which, in my opinion, should require authorization from the owners of the copyrights. 

In arriving at its conclusion, the court determined that the buffer used to process the steam of data only "copies" the data for a duration of 1.2 seconds, before transferring it to another buffer used to reconstruct a copy of the program for any customer who has asked to view it at a later time.  The court concluded that this "embodiment," i.e. the copy, was transitory in duration and therefore not "fixed" pursuant to Section 101 of the Copyright Act.  Therefore, the copyright owners' right of reproduction was not violated.  This is clearly erroneous reasoning:

The definition of "fixed" in Section 101 of the Copyright Act states, in its entirety:

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

In arriving at its determination, the Second Circuit focused on its condensed version of the definition, i.e. a work is “fixed” when its embodiment “. . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”  The court concluded, based on this shortened version of the definition, that the "language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements, i.e. an "embodiment requirement" and a "duration requirement."

The Second Circuit's error is grammatical in nature:  it misinterprets the language of the definition of "fixed" by assuming that the phrase "for a period of more than transitory duration" modifies the words "permanent or stable" when in fact it actually modifies the antecedent phrase "permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated."  This is certainly the case with regard to the RS-DVR - it fixes the copies for in sufficiently permanent state in one buffer (i.e. the 1.2 seconds) to permit them to be reproduced in another buffer for a period of more than transitory duration.  Thus, the court got it wrong.

Without getting into too much detail, the court also incorrectly analyzes a 9th Circuit cases, MAI Systems and its progeny which correctly apply the definition of fixed to a copy of a work created in RAM memory for a period of minutes.  The effect of this misinterpretation is to put legal practitioners in the precarious position of trying to determine at what point between 1.2 seconds and 2 minutes does a reproduction arrive at a "more than transitory" state.

Ironically, the Second Circuit ignores the U.S. Copyright Office's analysis of this precise issue in its 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which elaborated that a work was fixed "unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated."  This clarification is in line with my earlier interpretation that the phrase "more than transitory in duration" modifies the communication or perception, not the embodiment itself.  The Second Circuit stated that, in its mind, the U.S. Copyright Office's interpretation "reads the 'transitory duration' language out of the statute."  To the contrary, however, it is the correct interpretation in that it incorporates the transitory duration requirement into the appropriate section of the definition.

Finally, the Second Circuit completely ignores the last sentence of the definition, to wit:  A work . . . is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission."  In this instance, the court readily admitted that an unauthorized copy of the work was stored, i.e. "fixed" on Cablevision's servers simultaneously with its transmission.

When is an infringer not an infringer?

In extending recent trends by some circuits to weaken the strict liability component of the Copyright Act, the Second Court refused to find that Cablevision was a direct infringer.  Instead, it rules that the customer is the direct infringer in this instance of digital recording, showing his or her intent to make a copy when he or she presses the record button on the remote.  The court reasons as follows:

In this case . . . the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the infringing conduct.  After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that program airs, a copy of the program–a copyrighted work–resides on
the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made  this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.

Emphasis mine.  The first thing to note about the court's conclusion is that it realizes, right off the bat, that the copy created on the servers of Cablevision is an infringement.  In its mind, however, the only question is who made the copy.  Now, that, of course, flies directly in the face of a host of copyright concepts which I will not address here, but suffice it to say that this is problematic.

But, for the moment, let's just examine how the court ultimately determines who had the "volition" to infringe in this specific case:

There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems  clear–and we know of no case holding otherwise–that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.

The court then continues its analysis by example, offering the examples of a retailer who owns a photocopier and rents it out to the public as reinforcement of its conclusion, finding that because the retailer would not be liable for infringement, neither should Cablevision.   Despite the fact that there is case law holding that such a retailer WOULD, in fact, be liable for infringement, the Second Circuit errs in failing to see the difference between a VCR in the analog world, a single, stand-alone device used express by the customer, and a process devised by a company which makes infringement as simple as pressing my record button on my remote.  The court does not find this a "sufficient" distinction.  The court's error in logic is apparent in this prose when it examines a 6th Circuit case on the issue:

In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.

Is this 2001 Space Odyssey?  Did H.A.L. take over when I wasn't looking?  Who programmed the system?  

If this were not enough, the Second Circuit then performs a great deal of legal gymnastics to support its finding:  First, it examines the video on demand process to illustrate that Cablevision does not have control over the transmissions being recorded by theCablevision subscribers in the RS-VCR system.  Are they for real?  Ever heard of apples and oranges.  The VOD system is a fully licensed process which is, dare we say it, nothing like the RS-VCR system.  Secondly, the Second Circuit uses the distinction between "active" and "passive" infringement under the Patent Act to jump to the almost humorous, if it weren't so wrong, conclusion that:

If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute that would have this effect.

Every intellectual property attorney worth his or her salt knows that the Copyright Act and the Patent Act are very limited in their usefulness for purposes of using one to interpret the other.  That's why it's said that the Copyright Act is a strict liability statute, whereas, the Patent Act is not so much.

When is work "publicly performed"?

The final error committed by the court is in its analysis of whether the buffered copy delivered to individual customers was "publicly performed." In this regard, the Second Circuit concluded:

under the transmit clause, we must examine the potential audience of a given transmission by an alleged infringer to determine whether that transmission is “to the public.” And because the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission.

Again, the Second Circuit has to do a hatchet job on the definition of "public performance" in order to arrive at this convoluted conclusion.  The definition of "public performance" in the Copyright Act is actually found in the "publication" definition of Section 101.  It states, in its entirety:

To perform or display a work “publicly” means — 

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Emphasis mine.  Whereas the Second Circuit zeroed in on the phrase "to the public" in making its determination, the definition clearly intends to define public performance as any process that allows the public, in general, the ability to receive the transmission, whether or not it is in the same place or the same time.  Its not very difficult to see the fallacy of the Second Circuit's reasoning.   The Cablevision RS-DVR clearly does precisely what the definition anticipates, it creates multiple copies stored in the buffers for individual subscribers in multiple places, who then view the (buffered) transmissions at different times. 

While this seems simple, the Second Circuit jumps through numerous irrational hoops to arrive at the idea that:

the transmit clause directs us to identify the potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons “capable of receiving” it, to determine whether that transmission is made “to the public.”

Nothing in the statute dictates this conclusion, to the contrary, the legislators probably thought that the word "public" was generic enough to not need interpretation. 

The effect of this ruling, at least for now, is that anyone can make digital copies of any copyrighted work on their servers for purposes of transmitting to an individual customer, so long as that individual customer makes a request for it, and there is no implication of the performance rights.

This is a fine example of a court "reasoning" the meaning completely out of a statute. 

Conclusion

If it is not obvious by now, I think this is one of the most poorly reasoned and drafted opinions by a Circuit Court that I have read in a long time.  If there is a bright side, it is that the effect of this decision is primarily that it overturns the grant of a summary judgement by the lower court.  From a broader perspective, however, and the more unfortunate result is that, because of the concept of stare decisis, this reasoning can now be cited in other cases in other jurisdictions across the country as good law.  So, unfortunately, we entertainment attorneys will be dealing with the negative impact of this decision for some time to come, until perhaps some higher court, in this case the Supremes, decides to rectify it.

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Taking a Bite out of Apple: iPhone Hackers File Lawsuits

Posted with the permission of the author Matthew Williams, Esquire.  Matthew is an intellectual property attorney practicing with the firm of Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp.  All rights reserved.

Apple’s release of the iPhone in June 2007 was an unqualified business success - 1.4 million iPhones were sold in just a few months. However, as has become the norm when a business is successful, several legal problems have arisen for Apple and its telecommunications partner, AT&T. Many of these problems began shortly after the iPhone’s release, when a New Jersey teenager announced that he had circumvented the technological 'lock' that renders the iPhone inoperable with wireless telephone carriers other than AT&T. The hacking of the iPhone received almost as much press attention as its release and Apple estimates that as many as 250,000 iPhones have been unlockedapple_iphone . 

In response, Apple issued a press release which warned consumers that modifying iPhones in order to switch wireless carriers could damage the product and void Apple’s warranty. Apple also announced that future Apple software updates would likely render modified iPhones permanently inoperable. Shortly afterwards, an Apple software update did just that. Predictably, two class action lawsuits alleging unfair competition and antitrust claims were filed against Apple in October 2007: one, which also names AT&T as a defendant, in the US District Court for the Northern District of California,(1) and one in the California Superior Court in the County of Santa Clara.(2)

Among other things, the complaints allege that consumers may unlock iPhones legally on the basis of a November 2006 regulation promulgated by the librarian of Congress regarding exceptions to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s prohibition against circumventing technological protection measures. Furthermore, the complaints allege that the software update issued by Apple, rendering thousands of iPhones inoperable, was an illegal effort to prevent consumers from exercising this exception.

Whether the unlocking of iPhones fits within the librarian of Congress’s exception to the act depends on the answers to a number of difficult questions. It is far from clear that unlocking an iPhone is legal. The librarian crafted narrow language which limits the exception to circumstances in which “circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communication network”. 

At least one court(3) has ruled that unlocking a mobile phone for the purpose of reselling it to third parties violates the act and does not fall within the exception; fearing that many of the iPhone hackers purchased multiple iPhones for resale, Apple recently limited the number of iPhones that an individual may purchase and stopped accepting cash for iPhones. Determining whether the librarian’s exception applies to unlocking iPhones and, if so, how many of the class members involved in the cases fall within the scope of the exception are likely to be central issues. Copyright owners should follow these cases carefully, especially because the anti-circumvention provisions of the act are infrequently interpreted and are often critical to many business models.

Endnotes

(1) Holman v Apple, Inc.

(2) Smith v Apple, Inc.

(3) In TracFone Wireless, Inc v Dixon, 475 F Supp 2d 1236 (MD Fla 2007).

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Expert Witness Fund established to defend against RIAA Lawsuits

The Recording Industry v. the People, an anti-RIAA blog operatRIAA ed by New York attorney, Ray Beckerman, is cooperating with the Boston-based non-profit, The Free Software Foundation, to establish "a fund to help provide computer expert witnesses to combat RIAA's ongoing lawsuits, and to defend against the RIAA's attempt to redefine copyright law."

The Free Software Foundation was established to promote the development and use of free software.  It manages several campaigns to achieve that goal, including one called "BadVista.org," fighting the adoption of Microsoft Vista, and "DefectivebyDesign.org" which was established for the purpose of eliminating digital rights management in music and movies from "Big Media."

As of the end of November, the fund had raised over $4,000.  The fund will be administered by Mr. Beckerman and will be disbursed to technical witnesses hired by RIAA litigation defense teams on a variety of criteria, including the basis of the importance of the case to critical legal issues.

To donate to the fund, click here.

Thursday, November 8, 2007

Copyright: it's the end of the world as we know it.

Abraham Maslow’s famous “hierarchy of needs” places self-actualization as the pinnacle of human behavior.  To illustrate what the phrase "self-actualization" meant , Maslow said:

“a musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if they are to be ultimately at peace with themselves.” 

Of course, the thing that is important to note about Maslow’s hierarchy is that  physiological needs are at it’s base, i.e., a person’s basic needs must be met before Maslow's Self-Acutalization hierarchythat person can reach self-actualization.  In other words, “a guy’s gotta eat”!

Maslow’s theories shed some light on the ongoing social debate on the Internet regarding whether musicians would continue to produce quality music if copyright as we know it were to be abolished.  A different argument, though very related, is whether money motivates one to be creative. 

One movement advocate such ideas is the "Free Culture Movement."  Less extremist, perhaps, is Stanford professor, Lawrence Lessig's "Creative Commons" group, which advocates modified forms of traditional license agreements as a social compromise to "reconcile creative freedom with marketplace competition."  For other research regarding this debate, see also this interesting discussion on the site Against Monopoly and watch Stanford professor Lawrence Lessig's video on TED entitled "How creativity is being strangled by the law."

The underlying assumption of some of these parties involved in the debate, which is ostensibly grounded in the record and movie industry's recent campaigns against infringers, is that all intellectual property should be free for the public to use without payment and that the antiquated copyright laws should be modified or abolished.   In my opinion, this extremism  ignores the foundation principle of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, that in order to achieve self-actualization, an artist's or musician's base needs must be satisfied.

Proponents of the free culture movement observe that creativity and survived many years without the structural form which copyright superimposed upon it.  Indeed,  it is often observed that the great works of Mozart were created without the existence of copyright laws.  Let us not forget, however, that Mozart wrote many of his works while being employed by benefactors such as the Prince Archbishop of Salzburg, Heironymus Colloredo  and Emperor Joseph II of Vienna, names that are certainly not as prominent as Mozart's.   In fact, where would the world of the arts be without the billions of dollars that have been donated by benefactors such as J.P. Morgan, James Smithson, Bill & Melinda Gates, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, John D. Rockefellar, just to name a select, if not elite, few.  So, while it is true that "a musician must create music," it is also true that a musician has to eat. 

Long before the existence of copyright laws, there was a strong relationship between money and the creation of arts and music, and it will be that way until we abolish our system of currency as we now know it.   Walk around any great city and witness the existence of hundreds of pieces of commissioned artwork.  Listen to the commissioned works of Mozart, Beethoven and other great composers, who existed at the hand of benefactors.  Walk through the Museum of Modern Art and look at the works of art generously donated by J. P. Morgan and other benefactors.  Whether it be a king or a record label, money benefits art.  Creativity, like it or not, is often inspired by the almighty dollar, whether that is represented by paper currency or some other bartered for compensation which meets our base needs as human beings.  

That's not to say that people would not continue to make music or art if they were not compensated for it - they would.  That is an entirely different question in my mind.  People's hobbies and past time activities are in a slightly different class than, say, Don Henley.  If great singer-songwriters such as Henley could not make a living at playing music and writing songs, I would venture to bet that most of us would never had heard of The Eagles.  Again, even a musician has to eat.  If the musician cannot meet his base needs doing what he loves to do, a musician will meet those needs some other way and, therefore, there would be less time to do what he loves to do.

The only legitimate question remaining, then, is how should a musician get paid for the music he or she creates?  How should the songwriter get paid for the songs he or she writes?  The answer, in the United States, is by virtue of the rights created in the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, which gives Congress the right:

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Investors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

The portion of this Clause dealing with the arts is further codified in the various Copyright Acts and amendments thereto.  In a nutshell, the Copyright Act creates a legal fiction, intellectual property rights, which gives creators certain exclusive rights in their works, including the rights to produce copies, create derivative works, perform or display the work, and to sell and assign the works, among other things.

The laws in the U.S. are based loosely on English concepts and laws that date back to the 17th and 18th century and are a direct result of the invention of the printing press.  The first actual copyright law was the Statute of Anne, or the Copyright Act 1709.  The concept of a copyright is a three hundred year old concept that has survived the evolution from printing press to piano rolls to digital media, and I have little doubt that it will survive the technological age, despite the rumblings of these groups. 

As the law often does, though, albeit ever so slowly in most instances, it must evolve to encompass these new technologies and the debate that is ongoing will help us formulate new and improved amendments to the laws that will hopefully address the perceived dichotomy between the rights of free speech and free culture and those of the creators and owners of intellectual properties to receive just compensation for their efforts and investments.

In the end, this blog is the my response to viewing Larry Lessig's video, recently posted on the TED website, entitled How creativity is being strangled by the law (See the link above).  In it, Lessig harkens back to the days of Sousa when children sat on the porch and sang songs, and used the analogy of Sousa decrying the advent of the phonorecord as the demise of creativity.   He points out that in our current state, copyrights should be "democratized" because the new generation uses copyrights to create something different, as "tools of creativity" and "tools of speech."  And since every such usage requires a copy, he continues, every such usage is presumably an infringement of someone's copyright.  His solution is that the artist can simply license the use of their creation for free in the instance of "non-commercial" usages, and still retain the rights to exploit it commercially.  He refers to this as the "Sousa Revival."

But my question to Professor Lessig is why does the fact that an entire generation of Internet users are using copyrighted material to create derivative works mean that the rights of copyright holders have to be abolished?  Why do the creative urges of those who utilize other people's copyrights to create different works supercede those of the people who created the original works?  Why should they? 

Second, it is important to note that people would generally not pay money to hear most children sitting on the porch singing their songs, unless that child happens to be a Don Henley.  That is the difference between most of the music on, say MySpace for example, and the music found on iTunes.  There is a tremendous difference in the value of the spontaneous, albeit creative, songs of a child and the intricate lyrics and melodies which are the product of a genius the likes of Don Henley.

Let me illustrate the principles with an example for the world of physical property.  Person A has a piece of property populated with a lot of trees.  Person B, owns the lot next door, which is flat and has a nice stream of water running around its perimeter.  Person C comes along, see this situation and, overwhelmed with creativity, cuts down Person A's trees and builds himself a house on Person B's lot and claims it as his own.  When Persons A and B confront him, stating that the law says he cannot do what he did, Person C responds that his creativity is being strangled by the law and, therefore, the law should be abolished.  Is this a good argument?  This is the argument of the Free Culture Movement and the Creative Commons.

Just as the law creates real property rights so that a person owns in a plot of real estate, the law creates intellectual property rights so that person can own an intellectual creation.  Abolishing the one makes no more sense than abolishing the other.

Now, imagine that Person A's lot was full of reeds and twigs and Person B's lot was full of ravines, rocks and arid soil.  Person C would never stop to take a second look!  The argument of these movements misses the concept of intrinsic value.

What I do like about Lawrence Lessig's movement, Creative Commons, is that it is based on the Copyright Act.  It is essentially using existing copyright laws to create a unique license which strikes a balance between fair use and full copyright reservation.  In the end, however, the license are based on the rights already granted in The Copyright Act, proving that the current laws allow for the very thing that these groups seek.  I can agree with him in that respect.

Wednesday, November 7, 2007

The long tail wags the dog! An independent artist succeeds using the Internet

I have often advised my clients in the past that the new direction for independent artists is what I refer to as "guerilla" marketing, meaning finding alternative means of marketing your product.  One of the most explosive methods of doing that over the past few years has been the Internet.  One of the problems with marketing yourself on the Internet, however, is how do you get people to come to you?  The void of the Internet is so vast, that finding an artist whose sound is something that matches your musical taste is even more difficult than finding a needle in a haystack! 

So, it is a beautiful thing to see an artist actually breaking into the Billboard charts catapulted in large part by her success on the Internet, particularly her MySpace page.  Her success story gives hope to every artist whose desire is to put out a record, throw it up on the Internet, and have people flock to listen.

Enter Indianapolis, Indiana singer-songwriter Sally Anthony whose  "eTeam" of over 125,000 fans, including over 40,000 friends on MySpace, helped propel Anthony to stardom.  Thanks in largem_6c31918cf33c79bad2c07905f6783a30 part to that online community, Anthony's first album, Vent, released in 2004, sold over 175,000 physical and digital copies.  Two releases from that album spent months on the R&R pop chart.

Her new album, Goodbye, released October 23rd, has already sold 14,000 digital copies.  It has already reached the top of the pop charts at walmart.com, FYE Digital and iTunes and on November 7th landed at No. 9 on the Billboard Heatseekers Chart.  The album is being distributed by her company, Gracie Productions, through Imperial Records/EMI.

Anthony is succeeding because she is treating the music industry as broader than just the radio promoted, hit-driven, plastic disc business the major labels seem stuck in.  She is viewing the music industry as an entire package, generating buzz wherever she can, from the ground up rather than from the top down.

I predict that we will start to see more and more of these types  of breakthrough artist as the popularity of YouTube, Facebook, MySpace and other online communities grow in popularity and as the pioneers of the Internet find more creative ways to index diverse product, match it to the tastes and purchasing patterns of Internet users, and make recommendations - sites such as  LivePlasma, Pandora, Audiobaba, Last.fm, MyStrands and, of course, Amazon,

As radio fades into the annals of history alongside the monolithic corporate conglomerates that are r060719_Books_longtailChartecord labels, these innovative types of indexing sites will help those artists in the deep dark recesses of the "long tail"  find an audience for their music.  By the way, if you haven't read Chris Anderson's treatise on this subject, The Long Tail, buy a copy and dissect it now.   The long tail consists of that product that is not in the mainstream -- not on the shelves of Wal-mart -- but product that is still sought after and purchased by people.  Maybe it's only ten people per month, but people still want and buy it.  It is the millions of artist that fly below the radar of the "hit-driven majors."  These are the artists who can benefit from the exposure the Internet can provide.

add to del.icio.us :: Add to Blinkslist :: add to furl :: Digg it :: add to ma.gnolia :: Stumble It! :: add to simpy :: seed the vine :: :: :: TailRank

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

Courts taking a stricter look at evidence in RIAA downloading cases

There appears to be a slight ripple of a trend among courts to take a stricter look at the evidence being presented by the RIAA in its crusade against digital downloads, based primarily on the evidriaa2ence of user names and IP addresses assembled by their expert consultants, MediaSentry. 

In the RIAA's case against Jeff Dangler, filed in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of New York in Rochester, Dangler failed to file a response to the Complaint, and the Clerk entered the default against him.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the Plaintiff can then apply to the judge for a judgment based on the default.  In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P 55(b)(2) gives the judge the option to conduct hearings and hear evidence in order to determine if the damages requested are justified.  This gives the judge the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the underlying claim and, if he finds it to be deficient, deny a judgment on the default.

On October 23, 2007, U.S. District Judge David G. Larimer denied a 55(b)(2) request by the RIAA for a default judgment of $6,420 in Atlantic v. Dangler.   Judge Larimer specifically ruled that there were "significant issues of fact" in the record "as to the identification of the defendant from his alleged 'online media distribution system' username" heavyjeffinc@KaZaA.  The court points out that there is no evidence presented that established a time period of the alleged distribution and/or infringement nor are there details sufficient to determine whether, in fact, the defendant is the user so identified. 

Because of these deficiencies, Judge Larimer determined that he would hold a hearing to allow the Plaintiffs to establish additional evidence that a copyright violation was committed by the defendant.  You can read the full text of the judge's order here.

Previously, in August 2007, a similar 55(b)(2) request was denied by Judge Rudi Brewster in Interscope v. Rodriguez in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.  In that case, Judge Brewster held that "Plaintiffs . . . must present at least some facts to show the plausibility of the allegations of copyright infringement against on th[is specific] defendant," citing the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) that more than a mere recitation of the elements of a claim are necessary to find relief.   Basing his decision on facts similar in nature to Dangler, Brewster concluded that the RIAA's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

These decisions arise in districts where the judges are, generally speaking, more technically saavy than some other districts where these types of issues do not arise as often.  In a somewhat related case, the Ninth Circuit, the appeals court that has jurisdiction over the California district courts, one bankruptcy court has already established stricter standards of proof for establishing the veracity of computer records.  For more information, see the informative article entitled Admitting Computer Record Evidence after In Re Vinhnee:  A Stricter Standard for the Future?, by Cooper Offenbecher.  In short, this article discusses the interplay between Rules 901 and 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and their application to digital business records.  Essentially, without getting into the details, there is a hearsay exception for business records allowing their admission as evidence in a trial if they are maintained in the regular course of business and are relied upon by the business.   It is these sorts of dialogues that must inform the judges as they scrutinize the evidence presented by the RIAA in support of infringement claims, whether they be in the course of a default judgment or in the course of a trial.

 

Monday, October 22, 2007

Amazon to post third quarter earnings, including profits from MP3 Sales



Amazon.com, Inc. (Tickler Symbol: AMZN) will hold a conference call on October 23, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. ET to discuss its 2007 third quarter financial results. This announcement has tremendous relevance for those of us interested in the commercial viability of digital sales and downloads of DRM-free music -- since Amazon launched its online music store, Amazon MP3, which sells songs without copy protection in this fiscal quarter, the sales of said music will be a component of the report. Many financial analysts are expecting Amazon to announce earnings of around 18 cents per share on just over $3 billion in revenue for the quarter.

Most online reviewers agree that the Amazon experience of buying digital music is very favorable when compared to iTunes. My feeling about iTunes generally is that is an overbloated, unwieldy piece of software that doesn’t do the job it was designed to do very well at all, so this favorable comparison comes as no surprise to me. Although Amazon’s MP3 store is web-based, once you download a small companion program (on either Windows or the Mac) you get a better one-click experience than Apple's iTunes store, and the software automatically adds purchased files to iTunes, if you choose to use that software, or any of the myriad of better music players available on the Internet.

In addition to the favorable software experience, many users are impressed that Amazon offers over 2 million at an average of 10 cents less than the cost on iTunes. The offering, while only about 20% of Apple’s offerings on iTunes, is the largest collection of DRM-Free music anywhere.
Both UMG and EMI have signed up with Amazon, while Sony BMG and Warner Music Group still lurk in the Dark Ages when it comes to the digital spectrum. The only negative vibe about Amazon’s service is that UMG is slipping watermarks into the downloads to enable tracking.
According to some stock analysts, Amazon’s global site traffic rose 13 percent year-over-year in July and August.

The thing that attracts me to the Amazon model is the flexibility. The ala carte digital music can be used on any player, with any software and reproduced on as many devices as you want. It does not expire and you are not required to subscribe to any service or use any specialized players or software. This, in my opinion, is the business model of the future. As Amazon’s catalog expands, I expect that it will become increasingly more competitive than Apple. The Motley Fool described Amazon's chances for success in the digital music download business as follows:



Amazon sold $10.7 billion worth of merchandise last year -- $7.1 billion in
the form of media -- but at issue here is more than just respect for Amazon's
girth. Amazon is a trusted source in music. Now it also happens to offer the
better deal. If you have a choice of paying $0.89 on Amazon for a higher-quality
track with no DRM, or $0.99 for a lower-quality track with portability
restrictions, where will you turn?


I can only add that Amazon has an incredible database of customer preferences and cross-references. Amazon does an amazing job at suggesting impulse purchases.Most consumer already have an established account with Amazon that has established preferences. Amazon is the Wal-Mart of online merchandisers, the king of the Internet in sales. I believe it will succeed where others have failed.