Second Circuit gets it wrong in Cartoon Network v. Cablevision

On August 4, 2008, the Second Circuit court of appeals overturned a lower courts opinion that Cablevision's Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder ("RS-DVR") system violated the Copyright Act by infringing plaintiffs’ exclusive rights of reproduction and public perf ormance.  The full 44-page opinion is available at Cartoon Network, LLP, et al. v. Cablevision.  In my humble yet fully animated opinion, the Second Circuit's opinion was not at all well reasoned nor, for that matter, even common sense -- I believe it misinterprets at three very important areas of the Copyright Act and interpretation thereof:

When is a work "Fixed" According to Section 101

Through a system of buffers, Cablevision's RS-DVR will allow customers who do not own stand alone DVR's to record programming, which resides on Cablevision's servers, and "time-shift" it to view it at a later date.  Certainly a great concept, but one which, in my opinion, should require authorization from the owners of the copyrights. 

In arriving at its conclusion, the court determined that the buffer used to process the steam of data only "copies" the data for a duration of 1.2 seconds, before transferring it to another buffer used to reconstruct a copy of the program for any customer who has asked to view it at a later time.  The court concluded that this "embodiment," i.e. the copy, was transitory in duration and therefore not "fixed" pursuant to Section 101 of the Copyright Act.  Therefore, the copyright owners' right of reproduction was not violated.  This is clearly erroneous reasoning:

The definition of "fixed" in Section 101 of the Copyright Act states, in its entirety:

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

In arriving at its determination, the Second Circuit focused on its condensed version of the definition, i.e. a work is “fixed” when its embodiment “. . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”  The court concluded, based on this shortened version of the definition, that the "language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements, i.e. an "embodiment requirement" and a "duration requirement."

The Second Circuit's error is grammatical in nature:  it misinterprets the language of the definition of "fixed" by assuming that the phrase "for a period of more than transitory duration" modifies the words "permanent or stable" when in fact it actually modifies the antecedent phrase "permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated."  This is certainly the case with regard to the RS-DVR - it fixes the copies for in sufficiently permanent state in one buffer (i.e. the 1.2 seconds) to permit them to be reproduced in another buffer for a period of more than transitory duration.  Thus, the court got it wrong.

Without getting into too much detail, the court also incorrectly analyzes a 9th Circuit cases, MAI Systems and its progeny which correctly apply the definition of fixed to a copy of a work created in RAM memory for a period of minutes.  The effect of this misinterpretation is to put legal practitioners in the precarious position of trying to determine at what point between 1.2 seconds and 2 minutes does a reproduction arrive at a "more than transitory" state.

Ironically, the Second Circuit ignores the U.S. Copyright Office's analysis of this precise issue in its 2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act which elaborated that a work was fixed "unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated."  This clarification is in line with my earlier interpretation that the phrase "more than transitory in duration" modifies the communication or perception, not the embodiment itself.  The Second Circuit stated that, in its mind, the U.S. Copyright Office's interpretation "reads the 'transitory duration' language out of the statute."  To the contrary, however, it is the correct interpretation in that it incorporates the transitory duration requirement into the appropriate section of the definition.

Finally, the Second Circuit completely ignores the last sentence of the definition, to wit:  A work . . . is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission."  In this instance, the court readily admitted that an unauthorized copy of the work was stored, i.e. "fixed" on Cablevision's servers simultaneously with its transmission.

When is an infringer not an infringer?

In extending recent trends by some circuits to weaken the strict liability component of the Copyright Act, the Second Court refused to find that Cablevision was a direct infringer.  Instead, it rules that the customer is the direct infringer in this instance of digital recording, showing his or her intent to make a copy when he or she presses the record button on the remote.  The court reasons as follows:

In this case . . . the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the infringing conduct.  After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to record, and that program airs, a copy of the program–a copyrighted work–resides on
the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made  this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.

Emphasis mine.  The first thing to note about the court's conclusion is that it realizes, right off the bat, that the copy created on the servers of Cablevision is an infringement.  In its mind, however, the only question is who made the copy.  Now, that, of course, flies directly in the face of a host of copyright concepts which I will not address here, but suffice it to say that this is problematic.

But, for the moment, let's just examine how the court ultimately determines who had the "volition" to infringe in this specific case:

There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems  clear–and we know of no case holding otherwise–that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.

The court then continues its analysis by example, offering the examples of a retailer who owns a photocopier and rents it out to the public as reinforcement of its conclusion, finding that because the retailer would not be liable for infringement, neither should Cablevision.   Despite the fact that there is case law holding that such a retailer WOULD, in fact, be liable for infringement, the Second Circuit errs in failing to see the difference between a VCR in the analog world, a single, stand-alone device used express by the customer, and a process devised by a company which makes infringement as simple as pressing my record button on my remote.  The court does not find this a "sufficient" distinction.  The court's error in logic is apparent in this prose when it examines a 6th Circuit case on the issue:

In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant difference
exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct.

Is this 2001 Space Odyssey?  Did H.A.L. take over when I wasn't looking?  Who programmed the system?  

If this were not enough, the Second Circuit then performs a great deal of legal gymnastics to support its finding:  First, it examines the video on demand process to illustrate that Cablevision does not have control over the transmissions being recorded by the subscribers in the RS-VCR system.  Are they for real?  Ever heard of apples and oranges.  The VOD system is a fully licensed process which is, dare we say it, nothing like the RS-VCR system.  Secondly, the Second Circuit uses the distinction between "active" and "passive" infringement under the Patent Act to jump to the almost humorous, if it weren't so wrong, conclusion that:

If Congress had meant to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute that would have this effect.

Every intellectual property attorney worth his or her salt knows that the Copyright Act and the Patent Act are very limited in their usefulness for purposes of using one to interpret the other.  That's why it's said that the Copyright Act is a strict liability statute, whereas, the Patent Act is not so much.

When is work "publicly performed"?

The final error committed by the court is in its analysis of whether the buffered copy delivered to individual customers was "publicly performed." In this regard, the Second Circuit concluded:

under the transmit clause, we must examine the potential audience of a given transmission by an alleged infringer to determine whether that transmission is “to the public.” And because the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe that the universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission.

Again, the Second Circuit has to do a hatchet job on the definition of "public performance" in order to arrive at this convoluted conclusion.  The definition of "public performance" in the Copyright Act is actually found in the "publication" definition of Section 101.  It states, in its entirety:

To perform or display a work “publicly” means — 

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

Emphasis mine.  Whereas the Second Circuit zeroed in on the phrase "to the public" in making its determination, the definition clearly intends to define public performance as any process that allows the public, in general, the ability to receive the transmission, whether or not it is in the same place or the same time.  Its not very difficult to see the fallacy of the Second Circuit's reasoning.   The Cablevision RS-DVR clearly does precisely what the definition anticipates, it creates multiple copies stored in the buffers for individual subscribers in multiple places, who then view the (buffered) transmissions at different times. 

While this seems simple, the Second Circuit jumps through numerous irrational hoops to arrive at the idea that:

the transmit clause directs us to identify the potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons “capable of receiving” it, to determine whether that transmission is made “to the public.”

Nothing in the statute dictates this conclusion, to the contrary, the legislators probably thought that the word "public" was generic enough to not need interpretation. 

The effect of this ruling, at least for now, is that anyone can make digital copies of any copyrighted work on their servers for purposes of transmitting to an individual customer, so long as that individual customer makes a request for it, and there is no implication of the performance rights.

This is a fine example of a court "reasoning" the meaning completely out of a statute. 

Conclusion

If it is not obvious by now, I think this is one of the most poorly reasoned and drafted opinions by a Circuit Court that I have read in a long time.  If there is a bright side, it is that the effect of this decision is primarily that it overturns the grant of a summary judgement by the lower court.  From a broader perspective, however, and the more unfortunate result is that, because of the concept of stare decisis, this reasoning can now be cited in other cases in other jurisdictions across the country as good law.  So, unfortunately, we entertainment attorneys will be dealing with the negative impact of this decision for some time to come, until perhaps some higher court, in this case the Supremes, decides to rectify it.

Technorati Tags: Copyright Infringement,Direct Infringement,Contributory Infringement,Fixation,Public Performance,Performance Royalties,Digital Downloads,Intellectual Property,Internet Law,Computer Law

You Say You Want A REVOLUTION?

You say you want a revolution

Well, you know

We all want to change the world . . .

 

You say you've got a real solution

Well, you know

We'd all love to see the plan

You ask me for a contribution

Well, you know

We are doing what we can

 

But if you want money

for people with minds that hate

All I can tell is, brother, you'll have to wait

 

Don't you know it's gonna be alright?

 

-John Lennon

Perhaps John Lennon said it best:  if you push people hard enough and long enough, they will revolt.  The question is, has the RIAA gone too far for too long? A recent motion filed in their case against students at the University of Maine may very well answer that question.

The RIAA named numerous "John Doe" students in their complaint in Arista Records v. Does 1-27, as is their practice in all of their lawsuits.   The RIAA's purpose of naming the John Doe defendants is so that they may obtain an ex parte (i.e., without the other party being notified) order from the Judge requiring the targeted university to provide the various students' name, address, and, particularly, their IP address.

Student lawyers at the University school of law Cumberland Legal Clinic have filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the RIAA claiming that this practice improperly seeks to circumvent the student's rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, §1232g(b)(2)(B) ("FERPA"), gain publicity for its cause, and coerce students into settling for "nominal" amounts in the $3-5000 range.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions against an attorney who signs a pleading without properly investigating the facts and the law and does so with an improper purpose.

The motion also questions whether the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants under the RIAA-type lawsuits is proper because the actions do not, in fact, arise out of the same transaction.  Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Procedure provides that multiple plaintiffs can join in one action if “they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences…and any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).  Similarly, multiple defendants can be joined in one action if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transaction or occurrences . . . and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id.  The student motion alleges that the RIAA does not, in fact, believe that all of these copyright infringements arise out of the same facts, but join together against multiple defendants for the sole purpose of trimming litigation and discovery costs.

In this case, the student lawyers are seeking more than just monetary damages under this Rule 11 motion:  they also seek dismissal of the complaint and a permanent injunction preventing the RIAA from filing "fishing expedition" type complaints against "unconnected" defendants in the future.  These types of injunctions may be applied in jurisdictions other than the one in which it was issued, so in theory such an order may be applied to thwart lawsuits in other Federal courts across the country.

This in one ruling that should be very interesting.

 

Technorati Tags: RIAA Litigation,Digital Downloads,MP3,Entertainment Lawyer,Music Lawyer,Music Law,Copyright Infringement

Fair is not always "Fair Use"

The concept of “fair use” is a very misunderstood concept.  The first common misunderstanding that people espouse is that the concept of “fair use” is a right or privilege granted by copyright law.  It is not.  Secondly, many people mistakenly believe that so long as they do not make any money from an infringing use of copyrighted material, then the use is a fair use.  This is also an incorrect assumption. 

Fair use is not a right or a privilege to be exercised at one’s whim.  Rather, the doctrine is an “equitable rule of reason” that may be used as an affirmative d

efense in a copyright infringement action.  The purpose of the rule is to balance the equities between the desire to protect and therefore encourage the creation of new ideas and the desire to encourage the free exchange of speech in the marketplace of ideas.  The tension was described by Justice Souter as “simultaneously protect[ing] copyrighted material and allow[ing] others to build upon it.”  Nonetheless, the thing to remember is that application of the fair use defense is declared by judicial fiat in the context of a copyright infringement action.  It is applied on a case-by-case analysis of the factual situation.  Thus, fair use is not a presumptive right or privilege that may be exercised by the infringing party.

There are four factors weighed by the Supreme Court in making a determination of whether a derivative work constitutes a “fair use.”  These factors are (1) the nature of the work itself; (2) whether or not the work is commercial in nature; (3) the amount of the copyright work that is used; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market or value of the copyright at issue. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), codified at §107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.

The nature of the work refers to the “nature” of the unauthorized derivative work, not the original copyright work.  In order for such an unauthorized use of copyrighted material to be entitled to the“fair use” defense, the new creation must transform the original copyrighted material.  A “transformative work” is defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”  See, Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).   While all factors must be considered, this is perhaps one of the more critical factors in the analysis.  Merely modulating the pitch of a song or inverting the sequence of a chord progression would probably not be considered transformative.   A very good example of a derivative work that is transformative in nature is Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, the same story as Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind, but told from the perspective of a mulatto slave who is the half-sister of Scarlet O’Hara, the main character in the original work.  See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir 2001) per curiam, opinion at 268 F.3d 1257.  In that case, the Eleventh Circuit extended the protection of a musical parody in Acuff Rose to the novel.

With regard to the second factor as to whether a use is commercial in nature, it should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that the new creation has to generate profits.  If the new work create a significant fan, donor and/or advertiser base, those factors tend to lead to a conclusion that it is commercial in nature.  A person simply does not have the “right” to use copyrighted works in any manner as long as no profit is generated from the use.   It is also evident that this factor does not mean that simply because a derivative use does in fact generate profits, that it is by default not a fair use.  In Acuff Rose, 2 Live Crew’s parody version of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman had sold over 250,000 copies, yet was still considered a “fair use.”  The thing to be remembered is that this is but one of the factors.

The third factor is fairly easy to evaluate: the more material “borrowed” from the copyrighted source, the less likely the infringer is to have a “fair use” defense.  Again, another misconception is that there is a bright line test for fair use:  that a few measures of a song, a couple of lines from a poem, a few hundred words of a paragraph, or a few paragraphs from a book, are considered fair use.  This misconception has no basis in either the Copyright Act or the case law interpreting it.  It is merely folklore.  The factor, as used by the courts, is more of a sliding scale based, again, on the quantity of the material used from the copyrighted work as compared to the total material.

Finally, the last factor weighs the impact on the infringing use on the potential market and value of the copyright.  This was an integral part of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Acuff Rose that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh Pretty Woman did not impact the potential market for the original.   The more a derivative work negatively impacts the potential market for and value of the copyright, the less likely it will a "fair use."

In summary, as you may have noticed, the fair use doctrine is by no means a bright line test.  Each “fair use” defense is, by its very nature, evaluated on a case by case analysis in the context of a copyright infringement action.  Fair use is not something to be relied on as a presumptive right.

Technorati Tags: Fair Use,Copyright Infringement,Parody,Music Lawyer,Entertainment Lawyer,Music Law,Entertainment Law,Campell v. Acuff Rose

"More than a Feeling" - Momma, look what they've done to my song!

I received a call from one of my readers to address the topic of whether a songwriter has the ability to restrict the use of his or her composition in the instance it is being used in advancing a cause opposite to that espoused by the songwriter.  This was spawned, of course, by the recent allegations of Tom Scholz, lead member of the group Boston, that his 1970's mega-smash "More than a Feeling" was being used by Mike Huckabee, whose views were opposite those held by Scholz.  It is an interesting inquiry, and one that has simple solutions, mostly based in contract law.

There are two contract concepts that are usually incorporated into standard music publishing agreements which impact this issue:  one is the concept of droit or moral rights and two is the restrictions on exploitation.  I'll address them in reverse order.

Grant of Rights

Typically, when a songwriter assigns his copyright in a song to a music publisher, there is grant language contained in the agreement expressly establishing the rights he or she is granting to the music publisher.  In that contract language, there is typically a clause that reads something like this:

The Publisher shall have the right to administer, use and exploit all interests in the Compositions . . . provided, however, that the approval of Writer shall be required for the use of any Composition:

             (i)    in any motion picture which Publisher has actual knowledge of an "X" or equivalent rating; 

             (ii)    in any advertisement or other promotion for  tobacco, firearms or personal hygiene products; or

             (iii)    in connection with religious or political purposes.

As you can plainly see, in this instance at least, the music publisher would be contractually required to obtain the approval of the writer prior to authorizing the use of the composition in a political rally, among other things. 

If this type of language is not included in the songwriter agreement, or if the grant language included in the songwriter's agreement is, in general, more broadly worded, then the rights of the songwriter to restrict the use of the song would be greatly impaired.

Droit or Moral Rights

The other legal concept which comes in to play, both from an historic perspective and contractually, is the concept of droit or "moral" rights, although it is important to realize up front that this concept is most often applied, in the U.S. at least, to works of visual art, not musical compositions. 

First, in connection to the copyright concept, don't infuse the the word "moral" with the ethical connotations generally associated with in in the United States.  The use in this concept is much more in the sense of an embodiment of a type of something, i.e., the Monet painting is the moral equivalent of impressionist art.  As used in this sense, it refers to the ability of the creator of a copyright to control the "embodiment" of his work, or its "integrity."  The French-derived word "Droit" is, perhaps, more to the point when discussing copyright:  it means "a legal right." 

So, in the United States at least, the phrase "droit" or "moral rights" generally refers to the right of the copyright creator to prevent third parties from taking credit for, revising, altering, or distorting his or her creation, regardless of who owns the work, i.e., regardless of whether the copyright has been assigned or transferred. 

In contrast, the concept has generally received much broader application in European states.  France, for example, recognizes four moral rights: 

1. the right of disclosure;
2. the right to correct or withdraw works previously disclosed to the public;
3. the right of attribution; and
4. the right of integrity (the right to "respect" the work).

When the U.S. joined the Berne Convention, Congress attempted to bring its copyright laws into line with those of the other signatory companies by passing Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) codified generally at 17 U.S.C. §§106, 106A, and 113.   As implied earlier, however, this statute applies solely to visual arts and not musical compositions.  Nonetheless, the concept of droit or moral rights may be invoked when dealing with the misappropriation of a songwriter's musical composition.

In addition to copyright law, there a several other legal concepts which may be implicated in this situation.  For example, if a person is somehow giving false attribution to a creative work, e.g., attempting to pass off an creator's work as his or her own, that person may be liable under the concept of "unfair competition," which is barred by the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1051).  Or, if the creation is widely recognized as a work of the creator, any distortion or alteration of the creation may constitute trademark "dilution" under trade dress laws and statutes.   More generally, if authorship of a work is somehow falsely attributed, the creator may have a state action for defamation against the person responsible for the false attribution.  If a person uses the identity of an songwriter, or the compositions, for his or her own benefit without permission, a violation the songwriter's right of publicity may have occurred.  Thus, there may be several remedies available in this type of situation.

In the US, however, it is accepted practice that if a person can waive a right, such a waiver will be in a contract.  This is no exception.  Again, there is language in most songwriting agreements which "waives all droit or moral rights" in the copyright.  Such a waiver would likely nullify any of these general legal remedies available to the songwriter.

As always, I highly recommend that any songwriter contemplating a deal with a music publisher contact a reputable entertainment attorney.

Technorati Tags: More than a Feeling,Tom Schulz,Boston,70's Rock,Copyright Infringement,Music Publishing,Songwriters,Songwriting,Music Lawyer,Copyright law,Droit Rights,Moral Rights

Columnist David Pogue sings a humorous diddy about the RIAA

New York Times technology columnist and Emmy-award winning CBS news correspondent David Pogue is featured in this YouTube video singing a fun diddy about the digital wave of media on the Internet, ending with a humorous take on the RIAA and its wave of litigation against college students nationwide.  Enjoy

 

Technorati Tags: digital copyright law online internet law legal download upload peer to peer p2p file sharing filesharing music movies indie independent label freeculture creative commons pop/rock artists riaa independent mp3 cd favorite songs intellectual property

Atlantic Records et al. v. Brennan: Federal Judge Denies Default Judgment for RIAA

U.S. District Judge for the District of Connecticut  Justice Janet Bond Arterton, handed down a very pointed and decisive opinion hammering the R.I.A.A. for its boilerplate style of pleading in the nationwide wide campaign against illegal file sharing.   Justice Arterton was appointed by President Clinton in 1995.  The full decision is here:  Decision.  At several key junctures in the opinion, Justice Arterton based her opinion on the fact that the Plaintiff's complaint was based on "information and belief" rather than direct evidence.

The two areas of concern in the opinion, one is whether to grant a default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and the second is whether the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b).

Default Judgment Analysis under Rule 55(b)(2)

The granting of default judgment is generally almost a "rubber stamp" kind of process.  If the defendant is properly served and fails to respond to the complaint, a default judgment is almost always automatic.  If the complaint demands an exact amount as judgment, the default judgment can even be entered by the court's clerk under Rule 55(b)(1).  If not, then the court holds a hearing to determine the amount of damages under Rule 55(b)(2).  In this instance, however, the court stepped in and took it upon herself to examine the validity of the claims.

Reasoning from a 2nd Circuit case, Au Bon Pain Corp.v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1981), the court found that the default judgment process is not, in fact, automatic, but that “a district court has discretion . . . to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action.”  Artect, at 65, citing Wright & Miller, a well known legal treatise on procedure. 

Looking a another legal treatise, Moore's Federal Practice, Justice Arterton reasoned that the analysis should combine elements from Rule 55(c), the rule allowing the setting aside of a default judgment, and Rule 60(b), a more generic rule allowing  a court to set aside judgments.  Finding support for this analysis in 2nd Circuit case law, the court held that three factors arose in determining whether to set aside a judgment under either of the two rules:  (1) “the willfulness of default”; (2) “the existence of a meritorious defense”; and (3) “the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiffs should the default judgment be vacated.”

In weighing these factors, the judge determined that the latter two factors shifted in favor of the defendant, i.e., there were abundant meritorious defenses raised in similar cases filed by the RIAA across the country, and the Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by being required to produce more specific evidence.  In both instances, the court again mentioned the language that the Plaintiff's complaint was based on "information and belief."

Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted under Rule 12(b)(6)

The more telling section of the opinion is the court's ostensibly sua sponte (i.e., of its own accord) analysis of whether the Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This rule generally gives the defendant a right to raise this defense in a response to a complaint.   Ostensibly, the court raised this issue in the context of possible meritorious defenses.

Justice Arterton cites the recent Supreme Court opinion that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (2007).  She then observed that Plaintiff's complaint in this case was almost identical to the one filed in Interscope Records v. Rodriguez, where the court held:

Plaintiff here must present at least some facts to show the plausibility of their allegations of copyright infringement against the Defendant. However, other than the bare conclusory statement that on “information and belief” Defendant has downloaded, distributed and/or made available for distribution to the public copyrighted works, Plaintiffs have presented no facts that would indicate that this allegation is anything more than speculation. The complaint is simply a boilerplate listing of the elements of copyright infringement without any facts pertaining specifically to the instant Defendant. The Court therefore finds that the complaint fails to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted and entry of default judgment is not warranted.

Rodriguez, No. 06-2485, 2007 WL 2408484, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007).  Citing the Second Circuit case Greyhound Exhibit Group, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty
Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992), which held that the entry of default “constitute[s] a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability," Justice Arterton ruled that Plaintiff's complaint was "speculative" and "inadequate."

Eric Bangeman, of Ars Technica reports that the RIAA plans to file a brief, probably accompanying a motion for reconsideration, and possible an amended complaint, as they did in Interscope v. Rodriguez.  The amended complaint provided additional details about dates, times, and IP addresses.  Whether the additional details of that amendment will alter the application of Rule 12(b)(6) is still unknown, as the judge in that case has since retired.

Technorati Tags: RIAA Litigation,Digital Downloads,Copyright Infringement,File Sharing

Expert Witness Fund established to defend against RIAA Lawsuits

The Recording Industry v. the People, an anti-RIAA blog operat ed by New York attorney, Ray Beckerman, is cooperating with the Boston-based non-profit, The Free Software Foundation, to establish "a fund to help provide computer expert witnesses to combat RIAA's ongoing lawsuits, and to defend against the RIAA's attempt to redefine copyright law."

The Free Software Foundation was established to promote the development and use of free software.  It manages several campaigns to achieve that goal, including one called "BadVista.org," fighting the adoption of Microsoft Vista, and "DefectivebyDesign.org" which was established for the purpose of eliminating digital rights management in music and movies from "Big Media."

As of the end of November, the fund had raised over $4,000.  The fund will be administered by Mr. Beckerman and will be disbursed to technical witnesses hired by RIAA litigation defense teams on a variety of criteria, including the basis of the importance of the case to critical legal issues.

To donate to the fund, click here.

Technorati Tags: RIAA Litigation,Digital Downloads,Recording Industry,Copyright,MP3

Copyright: it's the end of the world as we know it.

Abraham Maslow’s famous “hierarchy of needs” places self-actualization as the pinnacle of human behavior.  To illustrate what the phrase "self-actualization" meant , Maslow said:

“a musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if they are to be ultimately at peace with themselves.” 

Of course, the thing that is important to note about Maslow’s hierarchy is that  physiological needs are at it’s base, i.e., a person’s basic needs must be met before that person can reach self-actualization.  In other words, “a guy’s gotta eat”!

Maslow’s theories shed some light on the ongoing social debate on the Internet regarding whether musicians would continue to produce quality music if copyright as we know it were to be abolished.  A different argument, though very related, is whether money motivates one to be creative. 

One movement advocate such ideas is the "Free Culture Movement."  Less extremist, perhaps, is Stanford professor, Lawrence Lessig's "Creative Commons" group, which advocates modified forms of traditional license agreements as a social compromise to "reconcile creative freedom with marketplace competition."  For other research regarding this debate, see also this interesting discussion on the site Against Monopoly and watch Stanford professor Lawrence Lessig's video on TED entitled "How creativity is being strangled by the law."

The underlying assumption of some of these parties involved in the debate, which is ostensibly grounded in the record and movie industry's recent campaigns against infringers, is that all intellectual property should be free for the public to use without payment and that the antiquated copyright laws should be modified or abolished.   In my opinion, this extremism  ignores the foundation principle of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, that in order to achieve self-actualization, an artist's or musician's base needs must be satisfied.

Proponents of the free culture movement observe that creativity and survived many years without the structural form which copyright superimposed upon it.  Indeed,  it is often observed that the great works of Mozart were created without the existence of copyright laws.  Let us not forget, however, that Mozart wrote many of his works while being employed by benefactors such as the Prince Archbishop of Salzburg, Heironymus Colloredo  and Emperor Joseph II of Vienna, names that are certainly not as prominent as Mozart's.   In fact, where would the world of the arts be without the billions of dollars that have been donated by benefactors such as J.P. Morgan, James Smithson, Bill & Melinda Gates, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, John D. Rockefellar, just to name a select, if not elite, few.  So, while it is true that "a musician must create music," it is also true that a musician has to eat. 

Long before the existence of copyright laws, there was a strong relationship between money and the creation of arts and music, and it will be that way until we abolish our system of currency as we now know it.   Walk around any great city and witness the existence of hundreds of pieces of commissioned artwork.  Listen to the commissioned works of Mozart, Beethoven and other great composers, who existed at the hand of benefactors.  Walk through the Museum of Modern Art and look at the works of art generously donated by J. P. Morgan and other benefactors.  Whether it be a king or a record label, money benefits art.  Creativity, like it or not, is often inspired by the almighty dollar, whether that is represented by paper currency or some other bartered for compensation which meets our base needs as human beings.  

That's not to say that people would not continue to make music or art if they were not compensated for it - they would.  That is an entirely different question in my mind.  People's hobbies and past time activities are in a slightly different class than, say, Don Henley.  If great singer-songwriters such as Henley could not make a living at playing music and writing songs, I would venture to bet that most of us would never had heard of The Eagles.  Again, even a musician has to eat.  If the musician cannot meet his base needs doing what he loves to do, a musician will meet those needs some other way and, therefore, there would be less time to do what he loves to do.

The only legitimate question remaining, then, is how should a musician get paid for the music he or she creates?  How should the songwriter get paid for the songs he or she writes?  The answer, in the United States, is by virtue of the rights created in the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, which gives Congress the right:

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Investors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.

The portion of this Clause dealing with the arts is further codified in the various Copyright Acts and amendments thereto.  In a nutshell, the Copyright Act creates a legal fiction, intellectual property rights, which gives creators certain exclusive rights in their works, including the rights to produce copies, create derivative works, perform or display the work, and to sell and assign the works, among other things.

The laws in the U.S. are based loosely on English concepts and laws that date back to the 17th and 18th century and are a direct result of the invention of the printing press.  The first actual copyright law was the Statute of Anne, or the Copyright Act 1709.  The concept of a copyright is a three hundred year old concept that has survived the evolution from printing press to piano rolls to digital media, and I have little doubt that it will survive the technological age, despite the rumblings of these groups. 

As the law often does, though, albeit ever so slowly in most instances, it must evolve to encompass these new technologies and the debate that is ongoing will help us formulate new and improved amendments to the laws that will hopefully address the perceived dichotomy between the rights of free speech and free culture and those of the creators and owners of intellectual properties to receive just compensation for their efforts and investments.

In the end, this blog is the my response to viewing Larry Lessig's video, recently posted on the TED website, entitled How creativity is being strangled by the law (See the link above).  In it, Lessig harkens back to the days of Sousa when children sat on the porch and sang songs, and used the analogy of Sousa decrying the advent of the phonorecord as the demise of creativity.   He points out that in our current state, copyrights should be "democratized" because the new generation uses copyrights to create something different, as "tools of creativity" and "tools of speech."  And since every such usage requires a copy, he continues, every such usage is presumably an infringement of someone's copyright.  His solution is that the artist can simply license the use of their creation for free in the instance of "non-commercial" usages, and still retain the rights to exploit it commercially.  He refers to this as the "Sousa Revival."

But my question to Professor Lessig is why does the fact that an entire generation of Internet users are using copyrighted material to create derivative works mean that the rights of copyright holders have to be abolished?  Why do the creative urges of those who utilize other people's copyrights to create different works supercede those of the people who created the original works?  Why should they? 

Second, it is important to note that people would generally not pay money to hear most children sitting on the porch singing their songs, unless that child happens to be a Don Henley.  That is the difference between most of the music on, say MySpace for example, and the music found on iTunes.  There is a tremendous difference in the value of the spontaneous, albeit creative, songs of a child and the intricate lyrics and melodies which are the product of a genius the likes of Don Henley.

Let me illustrate the principles with an example for the world of physical property.  Person A has a piece of property populated with a lot of trees.  Person B, owns the lot next door, which is flat and has a nice stream of water running around its perimeter.  Person C comes along, see this situation and, overwhelmed with creativity, cuts down Person A's trees and builds himself a house on Person B's lot and claims it as his own.  When Persons A and B confront him, stating that the law says he cannot do what he did, Person C responds that his creativity is being strangled by the law and, therefore, the law should be abolished.  Is this a good argument?  This is the argument of the Free Culture Movement and the Creative Commons.

Just as the law creates real property rights so that a person owns in a plot of real estate, the law creates intellectual property rights so that person can own an intellectual creation.  Abolishing the one makes no more sense than abolishing the other.

Now, imagine that Person A's lot was full of reeds and twigs and Person B's lot was full of ravines, rocks and arid soil.  Person C would never stop to take a second look!  The argument of these movements misses the concept of intrinsic value.

What I do like about Lawrence Lessig's movement, Creative Commons, is that it is based on the Copyright Act.  It is essentially using existing copyright laws to create a unique license which strikes a balance between fair use and full copyright reservation.  In the end, however, the license are based on the rights already granted in The Copyright Act, proving that the current laws allow for the very thing that these groups seek.  I can agree with him in that respect.

Technorati Tags: Copyright Law , Digital Downloads , Free Culture Movement , Creative Commons , Lawrence Lessig , Mozart , Beethoven , Maslow

del.icio.us Tags: Copyright law , Digital Downloads , Free Culture Movement , Creative Commons , Lawrence Lessig , Mozart , Beethoven , Maslow , Record Labels

Courts taking a stricter look at evidence in RIAA downloading cases

There appears to be a slight ripple of a trend among courts to take a stricter look at the evidence being presented by the RIAA in its crusade against digital downloads, based primarily on the evidence of user names and IP addresses assembled by their expert consultants, MediaSentry. 

In the RIAA's case against Jeff Dangler, filed in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of New York in Rochester, Dangler failed to file a response to the Complaint, and the Clerk entered the default against him.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the Plaintiff can then apply to the judge for a judgment based on the default.  In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P 55(b)(2) gives the judge the option to conduct hearings and hear evidence in order to determine if the damages requested are justified.  This gives the judge the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the underlying claim and, if he finds it to be deficient, deny a judgment on the default.

On October 23, 2007, U.S. District Judge David G. Larimer denied a 55(b)(2) request by the RIAA for a default judgment of $6,420 in Atlantic v. Dangler.   Judge Larimer specifically ruled that there were "significant issues of fact" in the record "as to the identification of the defendant from his alleged 'online media distribution system' username" heavyjeffinc@KaZaA.  The court points out that there is no evidence presented that established a time period of the alleged distribution and/or infringement nor are there details sufficient to determine whether, in fact, the defendant is the user so identified. 

Because of these deficiencies, Judge Larimer determined that he would hold a hearing to allow the Plaintiffs to establish additional evidence that a copyright violation was committed by the defendant.  You can read the full text of the judge's order here.

Previously, in August 2007, a similar 55(b)(2) request was denied by Judge Rudi Brewster in Interscope v. Rodriguez in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.  In that case, Judge Brewster held that "Plaintiffs . . . must present at least some facts to show the plausibility of the allegations of copyright infringement against on th[is specific] defendant," citing the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) that more than a mere recitation of the elements of a claim are necessary to find relief.   Basing his decision on facts similar in nature to Dangler, Brewster concluded that the RIAA's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

These decisions arise in districts where the judges are, generally speaking, more technically saavy than some other districts where these types of issues do not arise as often.  In a somewhat related case, the Ninth Circuit, the appeals court that has jurisdiction over the California district courts, one bankruptcy court has already established stricter standards of proof for establishing the veracity of computer records.  For more information, see the informative article entitled Admitting Computer Record Evidence after In Re Vinhnee:  A Stricter Standard for the Future?, by Cooper Offenbecher.  In short, this article discusses the interplay between Rules 901 and 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and their application to digital business records.  Essentially, without getting into the details, there is a hearsay exception for business records allowing their admission as evidence in a trial if they are maintained in the regular course of business and are relied upon by the business.   It is these sorts of dialogues that must inform the judges as they scrutinize the evidence presented by the RIAA in support of infringement claims, whether they be in the course of a default judgment or in the course of a trial.

 

Technorati Tags: Digital Downloads , RIAA , Entertainment Law , Copyright Infringement , Copyright Law , Music Law , Music Lawyer , Twombly

UT Student's Motion to Quash subpoena is denied in Virgin Records et al. v Does 1-3

On August 16, 2007, Doe No. 28 in the RIAA's action captioned Virgin Records America, Inc. et al. v. Does 1-33 filed a motion to squash the subpoena issued to the University of Tennessee on the grounds that, one, it was unreasonable on its face and, two, it violates his rights under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA").  The memorandum in support of this motion can be read Pike & Fisher's website, Internet Law & Regulation.  This was a case of first impression, i.e., this is the first time a court has issued a ruling based on this type of facts.

The Subpoena is Unreasonable on its Face

Does No. 28's primary argument in support of the proposition that the subpoena is unreasonable on its face was that plaintiffs could identify the name of the alleged infringer of the copyrighted sound recordings by being provided with the name and current campus address of Doe No. 28 and, therefore, does not need his permanent address, telephone numbers, e-mail address, and MAC Address, all of which would subject Doe No. 28 and his parents to unreasonable phone calls and mail. 

Plaintiffs countered that this information was necessary in order to uniquely identify Doe No. 28 to the exclusion of other defendants.

The court based its decision in this regard on Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that a subpoena may be modified if it poses an "undue burden" on the defendant.  The Court held that providing plaintiffs with the requested information was not unduly burdensome since college students are transient by nature and move frequently during their tenure at college, thus making it difficult for plaintiffs to locate Doe No. 28 if only a name and campus address is provided.

The Subpoena violates the Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act

In examining this issue, the Court looked at both FERPA and at the University of Tennessee's FERPA policy, which is posted online here.   The Court found the following:

FERPA broadly defines “educational records” as “those records, files, documents, and other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution.”  United States v. Miami University, 294 F.3d 797, 812 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)).  Directory information is defined in the statute as “the student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth...” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A).  According to the University’s FERPA policy,  directory information is “information not generally considered  harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed.  The University of Tennessee considers the following information to be ‘Directory Information’: Name, semester and permanent address, e-mail address, telephone listing, date and place of birth.”  Office of the University Registrar, What You Should Know About FERPA.  Furthermore, the University’s policy states that it is “not allowed to share  information (other than ‘Directory Information’) without a student’s written consent” and that a student may limit release of directory information by submitting a request for directory exclusion to the University’s registrar.

After summarizing its analysis of FERPA and UT's policy, the Court surmised that "most of the information [sought by the subpoena] falls within the category of Directory Information under FERPA," with the exception of the MAC address, which identifies the device used by Doe No. 28 to connect to the Internet, and therefore is not protect by FERPA.  With regard to the MAC address, the Court found that it was neither and "educational" record nor "personally identifiable information," and therefore was not protected by the act.

One note of interest in the Court's order was the revelation that Doe No. 28 had failed to argue that he had issued a "limiting request" as allowed in the University of Tennessee's FERPA policy.  The Court also made a particular note that the University's policy did not mention MAC addresses.  This seems to hint that the Court may have issued a slightly different opinion if these factors had been present, leading to the conclusion that students may want to write letters to their respective schools specifically requesting that no "directory information" be provided to third parties and asking that their schools not release MAC addresses as part of directory information and/or include such information in their FERPA policies.

The Court's full opinion is available online at the Knoxville News Sentinel.

Technorati Tags: Music Law , RIAA , Digital Downloads , Internet Law , Entertainment Law , Copyright Infringement , Subpoena